Appeals (1) from an order of the Supreme Court at Special Term (Kahn, J.), entered October 4, 1983 in Albany County, which granted defendants motion for certain relief pendente lite, and (2) from an order of said court, entered March 2, 1984 in Albany County, which denied plaintiffs motion for reargument and for reverse partial summary judgment. para. Plaintiff appeals from an order of Special Term entered October 4, 1983 which, inter alia, required him to pay mortgage, taxes and insurance for the marital residence, as well as $100 per week for temporary maintenance and $50 per week for temporary child support, and to maintain all existing available insurance coverage for defendant and the parties children. Plaintiff also appeals from an order of Special Term entered March 2, 1984 which denied his motions for resettlement of the October 4, 1983 order, for reargument, rehearing and renewal or modification of the prior order, and for reverse summary judgment of divorce on defendants first counterclaim. We affirm. para. Initially, we again emphasize that the most effective method to resolve claimed inequities in an award pendente lite is a speedy trial (see, e.g., Beckwith v Beckwith, 95 A.D.2d 943, 944; Baranyk v Baranyk, 73 A.D.2d 1004, 1005). This would appear especially true in a case such as this where the affidavits and supporting documents present sharply conflicting views of the financial situation of the parties and a speedy trial would permit prompt examination of the facts in far greater detail and much more accurately than on a motion for temporary relief (see, e.g., Woram v Gilliam, 78 A.D.2d 796). We further note that the award of temporary maintenance and child support is within Special Terms discretion and should not be upset absent an abuse of that discretion (see, e.g., Liss v Liss, 87 A.D.2d 681, 682; Baranyk v Baranyk, supra). para. Our review of the record reveals that considering the disparity in the parties incomes, the needs of the respective parties, the recent hospitalization of defendant, and the difficulties encountered by defendant in securing full-time employment, the temporary award made by Special Term cannot be deemed an abuse of discretion. The failure of Special Term to enumerate the reasons for its decision as to the award pendente lite, as required by section 236 (part B, subd 6, par b) of the Domestic Relations Law (see Liss v Liss, supra), does not require reversal or remittal for our discussion above concerning the reasons for the award remedies any such omission (see Berley v Berley, 97 A.D.2d 726, 727 [Silverman, J., concurring]). To hold otherwise would be counterproductive to our previously expressed view that a speedy trial is the best remedy for an alleged improper temporary award. para. Furthermore, we reject plaintiffs claim that the alleged procedural improprieties require reversal. The failure to use the long form financial affidavit (22 NYCRR 117.2) is not jurisdictional in nature and, inasmuch as the record reveals that plaintiff did not object to defendants use of a different form, cannot prevent the court from proceeding where full financial disclosure was made. The record also reveals that the order was served upon plaintiffs then attorney at a time when defendants attorney was in the hospital and without notice of plaintiffs substitution of attorneys and, thus, there is no merit to plaintiffs improper service claim (see CPLR 2103, subd [b]). Accordingly, Special Terms award pendente lite should be affirmed. para. We further note that although plaintiff never raised the issue of visitation until he sought rehearing, defendant does not seriously object to consideration of the issue of visitation. There does not appear to be any compelling circumstances which [102 A.D.2d 1009 Page 1010]
