ABSTRACT One of the distinguishing features of legal discourse is the highly restricted institutionalization of its authorship which is mirrored in the specialized character of the legal audience (cf. Goodrich 1987:117). This paper seeks to explore the various distinctions that can be drawn on the recipient side of legal communication on the basis of two legal instruments: statures and judgments. It is argued that it is the communicative function of specific legal texts that determines the type and, consequently, the identity of their recipients. The function in question is, in turn, crucially conditioned by the illocutionary intention manifested in a legal text by its producer. The notion of an illocutionary intention originates from speech act theory which provides a theoretical framework for the recipient-oriented analysis of legal texts carried out in the current study. Compatibility of speech set theory with the fundamental concepts of the positivist theory of law ensures, it is hoped, that the proposed account of recipient design is justified not only on pragmalinguistic but also on legal grounds.
