The book has been organized in five sections. The first one deals with goals of antitrust law and policy in the digital area, as well as legal tools and economic analysis. Authors discuss the inclusion of objectives beyond economic welfare in competition policies in the US, Europe
and Brazil; consumer choice under the consumer welfare standard; the revival and the role of behavioral economics in antitrust; particularities (or not) of competition in digital markets and multi-sided digital platforms; and data protection (in opposition to data itself) as a potential
valuable tool to antitrust analysis.
The second Section of the book is dedicated to merger control, including articles for and against the adjustment of notification thresholds in Brazil; the question about scrutinizing killer acquisitions; the discussion concerning the need of a "new merger analysis" for digital markets; bankruptcy and a screening test for failing firm defense; and trends based in CADE's caselaw, including relevant market definition, complexity declaration, associative agreements, the health industry and the very recent Boeing-Embraer case.
The third Section is about behavior control and is divided into three chapters, beginning with papers applicable to all types of conducts. Contributors discuss tendencies and modifications in the antitrust analysis of competitive behavior in digital markets, and procedural flaws and how to correct them. Among horizontal behavior, authors analyze price algorithms, labor related practices such as wage fixing and non-poaching agreements, hub and spoke infringements and exchange of sensitive information. The reviewing of consequences and concerns related to the hypothetical knock out of a leniency agreement closes this chapter.
